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This article is concerned with the ways in which
gender and development discourses and
frameworks have been appropriated into a particular
area of development policy and practice, namely
gender mainstreaming efforts in developing country
sector bureaucracies. Its origins lie in practical
encounters with these efforts while working over
the last few years in health sector development
programmes in poor countries that are funded by
substantial amounts of external aid. It is an attempt
to understand why these efforts cause me
considerable unease. The myth, in this context, is
not a single overarching one. Rather, it is a set of
linked mythical assumptions about the nature of
social and political transformation and how it is
brought about which led to, and became
encapsulated in, the practice of gender
mainstreaming in bureaucracies. The article also
argues that there are fables embedded in some of
the common discourses of gender and development.
The common thread is an inadequate understanding
of the policy domain and how gender and
development advocates can engage with it.
Gender mainstreaming in the sector
bureaucracies of poor countries has been associated
particularly with sector-wide programming in areas
such as health and education. Rather than each
financing discrete projects, agencies seek to work
with governments in a coordinated way to move
towards an agreed strategic planning and financial
framework with a common funding pool. Progress
in embedding gender equity goals in processes such
as this depends on building some level of national
and local ownership of these objectives (Foster
1999). While clearly in many countries there is
advocacy for gender issues from civil society and
grassroots organisations, this is much more rarely
the case in national and local bureaucracies. This
has led to sometimes considerable efforts by donors
at developing bureaucratic advocacy for gender
goals, mainly through gender training and financing
and encouraging institutional means of
mainstreaming, particularly gender cells, or the
designation of focal points in ministries such as
health. Yet a common complaint from gender
advocates is that of “policy evaporation” – the
tendency for policy commitments to gender equity
to be lost, reinterpreted or heavily watered down
as they move through (or become mired in) the
bureaucracy.
To borrow from anthropology, myths can be
good to “think with”. For projects of transformation,
they offer powerful ways of capturing and framing
complex messages in pursuit of desirable outcomes.
They can equally be problematic in reducing the
complex to the banal and seeming to promise the
riches of political change without the long work of
politics. As one of the major policy tools with a
direct lineage in feminist inspired gender and
development, gender mainstreaming in
bureaucracies can be an uncomfortable bearer of
some of its more mythical thought and practice.
The first task is to assemble the mythical elements
through an actual event.
1 The scene
A workshop is taking place in the Ministry of Health
(MoH). We are here to discuss the draft gender
equity strategy which three external consultants
have been putting together. The MoH has been
under pressure for some time from the donor
consortium which funds the health sector
programme to incorporate a gender strategy.
Consultants have come and gone. There has been
commitment and useful input from some of the
women’s groups and non-governmental
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organisations (NGOs), but no movement within
the MoH itself. Finally, one of the donors brought
in the three new gender consultants in a last attempt
to move the process forward. I was one of them.
The workshop brought together three sets of
actors: staff at various levels in the MoH, donor and
international agency representatives and a sprinkling
of women’s group and other “civil society”
representatives.
The external consultants who are facilitating
start off, as requested, with an overview of gender
analytical frameworks. They have decided to take
a low-key, eclectic approach to this task. The staff
are from different levels in the hierarchy and have
varying competence in English. Most of them are
unfamiliar with “gender” language and there is not
a readily accessible set of terms in the national
language for translating gender concepts. The
consultants stress that there is diversity in views
and understandings of gender, women, power and
powerlessness. They are anxious to avoid
prescribing “right” and “wrong” ways of engaging
with gender and to encourage the staff in particular
to make links with their understanding of the
broader programme goals.
The discussion which follows is largely
appropriated by donor representatives who are
concerned to lay down a correct line on what is
gender and how the term should be used. They
scold some of the bureaucrats for their
“misunderstanding” of gender, particularly in talking
about women’s health, rather than gender relations.
The effect is to confuse and silence the very people
who are expected to operationalise the strategy.
2 What is going on?
At one level, there is an easy reading of this. The
gender and development industry, as epitomised
in bureaucratic gender mainstreaming, is a soft
target. Here, we have all its less attractive elements.
First, there is an agenda driven by outside agencies,
often as part of the conditionality for aid. In this
case, gender is to a significant extent an externally
imposed (and in parts of the bureaucracy resented
and not understood) requirement for continuing
support. Second, there is capture of language and
resources by the particular kinds of elites which
the aid industry throws up. Postgraduate and other
training programmes in gender and development
have produced a new cadre of frequently young,
enthusiastic, but barely experienced development
professionals who nevertheless occupy influential
positions in funding agencies. Third, there is a
policing and even shaming of less powerful groups
whose discourses do not fit the gender and
development hegemony that the dominant voices
represent.
At the same time, there is a greater complexity
to be addressed here, of which gender
mainstreaming in the bureaucracies of subaltern
countries is but one important practical
manifestation. I feel the need to start from the
premise (admittedly a self-serving one in this
instance), that all the apparatus which sustains
gender mainstreaming – dedicated consultants,
training, masters degrees, institutional mechanisms
– is not just a massive exercise in bad faith or a way
of finding jobs for the girls (although it can certainly
turn out that way), that there has been good faith
in it and a commitment to gender as a transformative
project. So what happened between the passion for
social justice which fed the debates, and the reality
in many countries of a great deal of official apparatus
around gender but massive “policy evaporation” in
practice?
I will discuss two interwoven aspects of this.
The first is how the project of social transformation
became translated into practice in the increasingly
professionalised world of gender and development.
The second is the way in which the links between
theory, policy and practice were rendered relatively
unproblematic by naivety about “policy” and how
progressive change comes about.
3 Bureaucracies – drivers or
followers of change?
Sector bureaucracies have become a major focus
of mainstreaming efforts in aid-dependent countries.
It is not difficult to understand why. Programmes
are largely negotiated, designed, managed and
monitored by international and national
bureaucrats, not by and along with politicians and
civil society groups. Of course, the idea is that
bureaucracies do this on behalf of these key
constituencies. In practice, there may be initial
consultation processes (again a condition of aid)
which do reach out to other stakeholders, but they
rarely go beyond this or develop into sustainable
ways in which programme implementers can be
brought to account.
The reality in many countries, is that there is
often a dearth of institutional and political
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mechanisms through which citizens can have voice
and influence or can monitor what governments
do (or fail to do) in their name. Instead, influence
may be exercised through forms of personal and
political patronage and be heavily skewed towards
elites. The poor and particularly poor women have
little or no access to alternative forms of influence.
Bureaucracies are often heavily politicised with
officials balancing conflicting demands as they
struggle to protect their interests.
Gender mainstreaming in this environment is
therefore a paradoxical affair, subject simultaneously
to over-politicisation and depoliticisation. It
becomes over-politicised when linked to resources
to be competed for. It becomes depoliticised as the
demand for “industrial” or mass production models
of gender mainstreaming in the form of toolkits
and checklists grows. This in turn produces a bigger
industry of gender professionals, with careers
dependent upon a steady demand from
development agencies in particular for their services.
These processes lend themselves to easy
caricature – a political project becomes reduced to
a scramble for study tours and a “tick the box”
management of the gender requirements of the
programme. There are easy targets for blame –
opportunistic bureaucrats aware of the possible
rewards for talking “gender” and co-option of a
previously politically grounded gender advocacy
to often apolitical and prescriptive forms of gender
training. I would argue, however, that this kind of
depoliticisation is largely a consequence of a deeper
problem with the way the transformatory project
in gender and development came to be understood.
As advocates became engaged in translating feminist
analysis of gender and development into attempts
to influence policy agendas, the site of these efforts
shifted increasingly to institutions, and particularly
to national bureaucracies. What was lacking was
bringing together the theoretical insights of gender
and development with an equally sophisticated
analysis of institutional roles and functions and
how they are linked to or disconnected from the
possibilities for change.
Gender mainstreaming in sector bureaucracies
is one manifestation of this. It entails a mis-
specification of the nature, role and functions of
bureaucracies. Bureaucracies are not engines of
social and political transformation. Indeed, as
Orwell, Kafka and others remind us, we need to be
ever vigilant that they are not. In this sense, we have
cause to be grateful that gender mainstreaming
efforts in bureaucracies tend to become
depoliticised. Bureaucracy and ideological fervour
can make undesirable bedfellows. The appropriate
space and place for driving transformation is in the
political arena. Mainstreaming objectives which
place the onus on a bureaucracy to drive social
transformation, especially where the political
legitimacy of the institutions of government is
already fragile, will therefore continue to run into
the hot sands of evaporation. It may also be noted
that in the UK we do not expect our bureaucracies
to spearhead gender transformation in this way. We
simply expect them to do their job.
The role of a health sector bureaucracy is to
improve health systems functioning. That was at
least understood by the bureaucrats at our
workshop, even if the reality falls short of the vision.
That was why they persisted in talking about how
to improve women’s health because the sector
programme clearly headlines the health of women
and girls as the major strategic objective. But instead
of being encouraged in this, they stood accused by
the donor representatives of what has become the
cardinal sin in this version of mainstreaming –
namely of “only” meeting women’s practical needs
rather than their strategic gender interests. What
began as a contextually grounded political analysis
of different styles of advocacy and became an off-
the-peg gender training tool, ended up used as a
stick to belabour the bureaucrats with.
What was needed was not a ticking off for
focusing on women’s health, but a reinforcement
of this understanding in terms of enabling the
bureaucrats to understand in their own terms the
links between improved health systems functioning
and “gender equity” and to understand the role they
could play. For instance, the major complaints of
women about health services are the absence of
drugs in the facilities, illicit charges and indifferent
and disrespectful treatment by health workers. It
is within the remit and capacity of the Ministry of
Health to do something about these. If it did, poor
women would benefit enormously and there would
be knock-on improvements in other areas of their
lives. Such objectives are consonant with the
primary task of the health system as an organisation
and the links to “gender” can be brought out and
understood in these terms.
I would argue, therefore, that the main myth in
gender mainstreaming in sector bureaucracies is
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not so much a myth of political transformation
without politics, but more a mythic relocation of
the possibility of political transformation to an
inherently non-transformatory context. This mythic
relocation requires supporting myths. The first,
and most powerful one is that the empowerment
language of politics and advocacy can be transferred
into bureaucratic mainstreaming without its
meaning being changed. Yet institutions always
appropriate language and turn it to the service of
their own interests. Second, there is the myth of a
right and a wrong way to “do” gender in policy
contexts; and third, a myth that gender training
can produce a desirable and predictable behavioural
outcome.
As with all such myths, the relationship to reality
is a complex one. There are undoubtedly better and
worse ways of “doing” gender, but working out
which they are requires a high degree of sensitivity
to the context, and a large and often undefinable
dollop of wisdom derived from experience. These
are often at variance with the pressure for mass
production of gender tools and the rapid
development of a cadre of trainers. The jury is still
out on the value of gender training in bureaucracies.
There have been few systematic evaluations. One
of the few reviewed training in development partner
organisations, not in national bureaucracies (Porter
and Smyth 1998). It was equivocal about the
impact. Given the demand for training, however,
more attention needs to be paid to defining exactly
what it is trying to achieve, the contexts in which
it is effective and the approaches which are of value.
4 Naive notions – policy as a route
to transformation
Despite continual challenges from social science,
there has been little recognition in gender and
development practice of the very problematic link
between policy and implementation and the
implications of this for social transformation. This
is despite the excellent work of individuals writing
on constraints to change from an institutional
perspective (e.g. Razavi 1997; Kardam 1995).
This naivety towards policy takes a number of
forms. First, and linked closely to the bureaucratic
mainstreaming model of change already discussed,
is the issue of bypassing political processes. Second,
is the assumption of a prescriptive and predictable
relationship between policy intention and policy
outcome. Third, is the tendency to treat discourse
and terminology as if they are in themselves
independent agents of, or impediments to, change.
Let us consider these further.
4.1 Political bypass
I have already argued that it is not the role of
bureaucracies to transform gender relations and
bureaucracies should not be used as a proxy for
this. Transformative actions enshrined in progressive
policies on gender require political coalition-
building, not just a statement on a statute book and
a directive to the bureaucracy to carry them out. It
follows from this that the apparatus which has been
created from professionalising gender and
development can play only a modest supporting
role in the transformative project. It cannot
substitute for the work of politics.
4.2 Intentions and outcomes
The complexity and sophistication of gender and
development frameworks have not extended to
their translation into the policy environment. There
has been an almost mechanical belief in the power
of intention to determine the outcome of policy
implementation. This has generated the myth that
policies can be judged on a prior reading of their
intent. This is particularly clear in the appropriation
of the practical needs/strategic interests distinction
to the gender policy toolkit. We have not taken
seriously the doctrine of unintended consequences.
If we had then we would have understood better
the inherently messy and unpredictable nature of
this relationship.
In their examination of local economic
development projects in a poor urban area of
Durban, South Africa, Beall and Todes (2003) give
a compelling account of the ways in which carefully
crafted “gender sensitive” planning led to
unexpected outcomes, partly because women did
not simply respond as anticipated and partly
because some (well-meant) aspects of project
implementation inadvertently damaged women by
reinforcing elements of existing social relations and
inequalities.
They note that ultimately it was those women
who were politicised already, through engagement
in earlier political struggles or engaged in local
politics, who were able to advance a progressive
political and social agenda for women. The technical
activities of gender planning were a largely irrelevant
sideshow to the political arena. They note also that
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the struggle has been slow, uneven and
unpredictable. The experience causes them to
question the whole value of externally promoted
gender-based planning, particularly in a context
where an internally developed politics of
transformation already exists.
One important lesson from this is that women
are social agents. As agents, they have capacity to
subvert intentions, good or bad. This may be by
turning paternalism to their advantage or by
“refusing” to be progressive if they construe their
interests in a different way from the planners. At
the same time, policies can also “misbehave”: well-
intentioned ones can have bad outcomes, and vice
versa.
Over-reliance on intention as the arbiter of good
and bad policies is linked to an overconfidence that
gender and development planning can identify
women’s interests and devise a pathway to meeting
them. This is despite a rich theoretical debate in
gender and development on the concept of interests
and who is entitled to define them, as well as
practical examples that should serve as warnings
(Razavi and Miller 1995). For instance, writing on
the difficulty of conceptualising women’s interests
as separate or separable from those of their
households, Whitehead (1990) notes that in the
context of policies that may increase their household
labour burdens, women may feel the trade-off
between labour intensification and outcomes is
worth it if the outcome advances the interests of
the household as a whole. Yet labour intensification
occupies a large space in the canon of gender and
development “ills”.
4.3 Misbehaving discourses
The richness of theoretical work in gender and
development owes much to discourse analysis,
which has unpacked the histories, assumptions and
political trajectories of different strands of
development thinking in terms of their gender
implications. Again, however, this has been to the
neglect of an equally rich exploration in the policy
domain of the relationship between discourses and
outcomes.
We have instead substituted fables for evidence-
based assessments.1 These are often in the form of
binary oppositions. Two particularly tenacious ones
are the discourses of equity versus efficiency, and
instrumentalism versus equity or advocacy. There
has been a great preoccupation with critiquing the
development corpus in terms of these discourses,
along with exhortations to institutions and actors
in the development field to choose the “right”
discourse. Much less effort has been expended on
understanding how – if at all – these discourses
connect to policy implementation in all its
complexity.
Instead, we have attached a moral hierarchy to
these gender fables, ranking them against each other
in a way that abstracts them from their political and
social context. Critiques of instrumentalism have
been made most strongly on what might be termed
absolutist discursive grounds. Instrumentalism is
therefore ultimately a “bad” discourse as opposed
to equity, which is a “good” one, although we might
concede that it is occasionally necessary as a tactic
if all else fails. But as with bad stepmothers, bad
discourses must be ousted and shamed. Razavi
(1997) makes a powerful case against this tendency
in her discussion of policy advocacy strategies. She
points to the weaknesses of discursive absolutism
when faced both with the complex realities of
women’s and men’s lives, and the constraints of
working within institutions to try to bring a gender
perspective into the policy frame.2
Her analysis of gender policy discourses notes
the difficulties that gender advocates face when
working within institutions on gender issues. There
is not only hostility and indifference to the idea of
gender itself, but also the everyday political battles
and sectional interests which are present in all
organisations. Faced with these realities, internal
advocates need to use whatever discursive means
make sense to fight their corner. She argues that
charges of “instrumentalism” from outside are
therefore unhelpful. Advocates have to both render
their arguments meaningful to an ungendered
audience, and do it in a way that makes them more
likely to be accepted and acted upon. As Razavi
points out, this kind of internal advocacy within
institutions is again not an inherently transformative
project. It only becomes so when those outside the
institution – activists and researchers – can connect
it to the political world and to pressures for change.
We can add to this that the discursive framing will
itself then be transformed by this political
connectedness.
Razavi also makes an important plea for using
or rejecting discourses on the basis of evidence.
Here is one of the key lessons from the history of
policy engagement. By no means can all battles for
IDS Bulletin 35.4 Repositioning Feminisms in Development
86
gender transformation be won by informed
advocacy, but evidence and rational argument
remain our most powerful tools in engaging with
institutions. This must include interrogating our
own discourses and rescuing them where necessary
from the realms of the fable.
5 Concluding reflections
I have argued that gender mainstreaming in
developing country national bureaucracies has been
a flawed project based on a myth about how social
transformation in gender relations occurs.
Associated with this has been an inadequate
theorisation of the relationship between theory,
policy and implementation and particularly the
roles and functions of institutions which set “policy”
or mediate its implementation.
Why did some of us, whether as academics,
advocates, practitioners or combinations of these,
end up understanding mainstreaming and policy
in these particular ways? Was it a certain naivety
about how real world institutions work? Or was it
an inevitable byproduct of professionalising gender
and development, particularly in contexts where
many of the practitioners do not come from a
background in political activism?
There is some truth in both of these. The main
route to professionalisation of gender and
development has been through academically based
courses taught mainly by academics, often with a
background in feminist advocacy. This has provided
an excellent basis for theoretically rigorous analysis.
But we have struggled to carry this forward into the
recalcitrant arenas of policy and implementation.
We did not make sufficient use of the experience
of our students who came from a policy
background, nor did we pay enough attention to
the skills they would need to go back into those
environments and operate more effectively. These
skills cannot just be advocacy-based but require a
grounding in how institutions work, how to develop
contextually-based strategies and create workable
alliances in constrained environments.
Instead, the focus of application has been on off-
the-peg tools and frameworks, fuelled by the
demand for gender mainstreaming. These are not
necessarily bad in themselves and I would suggest
that the charge of depoliticisation is often misplaced.
It is perhaps unavoidable that – in needing to
provide an orderly route map for busy people, they
exclude context and complexity and become banal
and mythic. For instance, one of the results has
been a too-automatic privileging of gender relations
in practical and policy discourses (Razavi and Miller
1995) to the detriment of other contextually
important signifiers of difference and inequality.
What is more troubling is how this industry
speaks to power relations through its embeddedness
in international aid programmes. The
professionalisation of gender and development took
place in large measure through the demand from
and financial support of development agencies.
Most funding of work in gender and development
derives from international and bilateral agencies.
As bureaucracies themselves, they have led the
efforts at mainstreaming. Many of us depend for
our livelihoods on doing this work on their behalf.
We also need to stand back and examine our
practice more critically.
In particular, we need to develop a more situated
analysis of the shifting and complex relationships
of gender, class, culture, North and South
encapsulated in events such as the workshop
described above. What are the different sorts of
power operating here and who is using or abusing
them? How do we begin to think about the
dynamics of power in encounters between, for
instance young, often female and white, aid
bureaucrats and older, often male officials of national
bureaucracies?
How far does any of this matter? I think the
answer is again a paradoxical one. It matters both
a little and a lot. The logic of my argument about
bureaucratic mainstreaming is that it matters less
than we have tended to think. The apparatus of
mainstreaming can at most make a modest
contribution to political transformation. It matters
a lot in three senses. First, we could do it better by
rescuing it from an impossible project to transform
gender relations to a more modest adjunct to
improving necessary things which can make a
difference in women’s and men’s lives. Second, we
could “do” policy much better by paying the same
rigorous attention to it as we do to the political
economy of gender relations. Third, we need to
acknowledge and explore the less obvious power
relations which a professionalised gender and
development industry has brought into being.
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Notes
* Thanks to Gerry Bloom for insightful comments on an
earlier draft.
1. I use fable in the sense of a story told to convey a lesson,
not to represent a body of evidence.
2. See Razavi’s (1997) discussion of the dilemmas
experienced by gender advisers in the World Bank.
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